Chuck Grassley: “this is what the article says. ``Lax internal controls'' are the cause for ``a dramatic increase in embezzlement across…”

“this is what the article says. ``Lax internal controls'' are the cause for ``a dramatic increase in embezzlement across the board.'' ``Lax internal controls'' will be laxer-if Section 401 goes through. Now, Mr. President, there is no magic in a receipt. A receipt is not a leakproof defense against fraud--mainly because a receipt is so easy to forge. A receipt by itself is not much of a weapon. It is just one weapon in the controller's arsenal. To be an effective weapon, a receipt must be coupled to other control devices--like separation of duties. Unfortunately, at the Pentagon, receipts don't necessarily go hand-in-hand with the other control mechanisms. I learned that lesson in my examination of several DOD fraud cases: The Lugas case at Reese AFB, Texas; the McGill case in Norfolk, VA; and the Krenik case in the Pentagon. In these cases, there was no separation of duties. For example, I discoverd that Mr. Krenik's duties literally covered the waterfront. He was involved in every phase of the cycle of transactions from beginning to end. He: developed requirements for goods and services, wrote purchase orders, steered contracts to favored vendors, received and accepted deliveries, certified contract performance by signing receiving reports like the DD-250, and submitted invoices to the finance office for payment. In Mr. Krenik's organization--the 7th Communications Group--there was no separation of duties.”