On the recordFebruary 15, 2011
It is time to end the Joint Strike Fighter second engine mistake. In 2001, the GE engine lost in procurement competition to the one designed by Pratt & Whitney. A sole source development contract was signed in 2005. But since 1997, Congress has provided for a Joint Strike Fighter alternative engine program. This continuing resolution includes $450 million for the alternate engine in the Joint Strike Fighter. According to the Pentagon, the second engine's cost is close to $2.9 billion. The Department of Defense is clear: in their view, our military and the taxpayers are best served by not pursuing a second engine. There are more pressing Department of Defense priorities. There is just no guarantee that having two engines will create enough long-term savings to outweigh the near-term costs of nearly $3 billion. The risk from a single engine is reasonable and consistent with past acquisitions. A single engine is not a new approach and does not create dangerous levels of risk. We currently have two current aircraft programs, the F-22 and the F-18, which both utilize a single engine provider. Additional costs and the burden of maintaining two logistical systems are not offset by the potential savings generated through competition. We are not making procurement decisions in a vacuum. If we had all the money in the world, maybe an alternate engine would be a good idea. But we don't.





