I oppose Mr. Self's amendment to strike section 307 of the INVEST Act. Section 307 is identical to H.R. 3357 sponsored by guess who? It is sponsored by Mr. Meeks. It closes gaps in the disclosures made to investors where there are multi-class government structures. Companies that use these structures offer different share classes, such classes having different rights like voting rights. These structures can allow corporate insiders to retain an outsize amount of voting power relative to their shares. For instance, Mark Zuckerberg has been able to consolidate control over Facebook, and now Meta, primarily due to the dual-class share structure that he established. This structure allows him and a small group of insiders to hold class B shares which have 10 times the voting power of the class A shares sold on the open market. As a result, Zuckerberg has maintained nearly 60 percent of the voting power in Facebook, even though his shares account for only about 18 percent of shares. Mr. Meeks' provision was recommended by the SEC's Investors Advisory Committee and passed out of committee with unanimous support, and it has also passed both this Congress and the prior two nearly unanimously. Investors should have the clearest information available to make the best decision for themselves, but Mr. Self's amendment would deny them that.
Editor's note · Context
Opposing an amendment to the INVEST Act related to investor disclosures in multi-class government structures.
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