John McCain

It is critically important that the United States maintain a modern and effective ICBM force.

It appears that both Russia and the United States will have the capability to upload large numbers of warheads in fairly short order.

I fear that there is already a gap emerging between expectations and fiscal realities.

Russian cheating could have significant political and strategic implications if the assumptions about the scope and timing of possible Russian cheating used in consideration of this question are less than optimistic.

Do you feel we should be concerned that this treaty may impede the development and deployment of our future prompt global strike capability?

I share Dr. Anastasio's concerns regarding the inadequacy of the funding identified in the administrations section 1251 report.

The verification provisions of New START are inadequate to give us the depth of knowledge that we will need, given Russian military doctrine and modernization programs.

The inadequacy of that standard alone for credible deterrence and assurance has been recognized by Democratic and Republican administrations alike.

Our so-called tactical nuclear weapons in Europe provide a strategic deterrent to Russia's tactical nuclear weapons that are a strategic threat to NATO.

As strategic arsenals are reduced, the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is bound to erode.

Does cheating matter?

What leverage do we have to compel Russia to discuss reductions of its tactical arsenal in the future if we were to ratify the New START treaty?

Perhaps it will be with bombers, rather than ICBMs, if they have an effective missile defense.

Then is it agreeable to you that this committee and the Senate have the ability to carefully review the negotiating record so that the record can be set straight?

This request is not unprecedented. The Senate has previously sought and received access to the negotiating history for arms control treaties.

I thank our witnesses for their service and for joining us today.

For the next 10 years a New START treaty could trump the deployment of a Prompt Global Strike capability.

Many of us have concerns about the New START's methods of verification, its constraints on ballistic missile defense (BMD), and the accompanying plan for modernization of both the nuclear stockpile and our nuclear delivery vehicles.

I don't understand why we go to the trouble of negotiating with a potential adversary with the understanding that the adversary is going to cheat.

If cheating doesn't matter, then what's the point of a treaty, Dr. Foster?

Defensive systems would inhibit and make uncertain the threat of a first strike against the United States of America.

I view missile defense as a way of inhibiting a first-strike motivation by the part of the Russians or anybody else.

I believe that a substantive assessment of the New START treaty demonstrates that the treaty is in the U.S. national interest.

Last year, the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission alerted Congress to the dire need for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex.

A failure to ratify would carry substantial costs for the United States.