On the recordMarch 5, 1999
Well, first of all--[laughter]--you know, she's been doing this for quite a long time. [Laughter] And it's not a fair fight. She's better at it than I am. Let me, first of all, say about Kosovo, I don't think it's fair to say that NATO threatens and backs away. We took military action in Bosnia, which led directly to the peace. So I don't think Mr. Milosevic is under any illusion that if NATO has an action order outstanding, that we won't activate it. And I would be astonished to believe that our allies would back away from a commitment we had made. I think what happened at Rambouillet was quite important and justified the request, not of Serbia but of both parties--both parties-- for some more time to try to sell this agreement, to ruminate on it, to decide how to respond to it. The Kosovars themselves wanted that. Finally we have an agreement, not in every single point but in large measure, between the Serbs and the Kosovars on what the nature of autonomy would be over the next 3 years. That's quite an astonishing achievement. And so my perception is quite the reverse. I think we were facing a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo last summer. We came in with the threat of force, and it worked, and we averted it. And we didn't have to use force because we averted the tragedy; we got what we wanted. Were there violations of the cease-fire? Yes, but they were violations from both sides. And there were problems there. But that's why we started this new process with the new NATO action order. It became clear we had to do more because, particularly, of the terrible killings in one village in Kosovo, that were precipitated by the Serbs. Now, I do not believe that, at least at the present point, Mr. Milosevic could be under any illusion, based on what happened in Bosnia that--from the point of the view of the United States, anyway, and what NATO has said--that we will keep our word. And I think we did the right thing to give both parties the time they asked for at Rambouillet to try to figure out how to get to ``yes.'' The most important thing here is how to get to ``yes.'' It's a good agreement. It will save lives. It will stabilize Kosovo. It will move us toward genuine autonomy, which was working there, I might add, before it was taken away a decade ago. Now, on the ABM Treaty, let me say, doing the research on a missile defense system, which is not a violation of the ABM treaty--it is theoretically possible that we could develop a missile defense system that, either by its nature or by where it was deployed, would be a violation of the ABM Treaty. I, personally, have told the Russians over and over again I have no intention of abrogating the ABM Treaty. Anything we do, we will do together. But the only threat we have--excuse me--the threat that the United States is likely to face 10 or 20 years from now from missiles coming in is by no means--not just from North Korea. It is a fact that many countries with whom we have serious differences now are making vigorous efforts either to build or to buy missiles with increasing ranges, that go distances far beyond anything that would be necessary to protect their own territory. General Shelton has said that this missile defense is tough; it's like trying to hit a bullet with a bullet. That's what missile defense is. I think if we believe that the technology might be there, we owe it to ourselves and to all of our allies, not just our old allies but some of our post-cold-war allies, to try to develop that, along with an adequate warning system, to try to prevent countries that are desperately trying to get missiles, that they could not possibly need to defend their own territory, from ever taking offensive action against us or anyone else. But I have no intention of supporting or initiating a unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty. I will not do that. We have been very candid with the Russians. We have talked to them about what we are going. We have talked about what kinds of information we might share in the future. But I have never advocated, initiated, encouraged, sanctioned, or blinked at the possibility that we could unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty. I personally would be very opposed to that. NATO Bases in Italy
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