But I would also add to that list of items the process itself as it relates to their ability to interact with the Pentagon.

I am a great believer that structure is policy. If you have a messy structure, you end up with a messy policy.

I want to emphasize on a timely basis--while protecting our taxpayers' dollars.

Too many defensive acquisition programs over-promise and under-deliver on cost and schedule.

I'm a big supporter of job training and apprenticeship programs that match workers' training with the skillsets in demand.

I recognize the difficulty that many employers face in this area and the potential repercussions for vital industries across the country.

A fair playing field for American workers is certainly a priority for me, and I strongly support promoting human rights and free markets for the benefit of workers generally.

But you feel at this point the contract and the development is on track?

I hope that you'll keep in touch with the committee on that project as it moves forward.

So basically what you're saying is if you don't have additional funding over and above what you had for last year, you'd run out of money and that's why you'd have to ground those squadrons.

So part of the problem with a continuing resolution is predictability and maintaining your acquisitions and maintaining the industrial base.

I commend--again, we've got to think very creatively about how we fill this shortfall.

I think it's one of the most important that we have, that the Air Force and the government is undertaking.

It's been very illuminating, and we look forward to working with you.

Well, that is exactly the experience of the Air Force and to some extent the Navy of doing R&D while you are building.

The first requirement would be that the requirements be expressed in no more than 10 pages.

Practicality and buildability is part of the requirements process.

Now, has the Army made institutional structural changes to deal with these issues?