Michael S. Barr

The report that we released suggests that both the Board in Washington and the San Francisco Fed did not hold up the bank with enough pressure.

The obligation, obviously, is on Congress and the Executive Branch to work out an arrangement on the debt ceiling to raise it.

The argument for why regulation and monetary policy are both at the Fed is that it is supposed to inform each other.

The responsibility of bank management is to take the monetary policy, the interest rate world around it, and to respond with appropriate risk metrics, and they didn't do that.

Overall, our banking system is sound and resilient.

I have said repeatedly that banks, according to our rules, are well-capitalized today. Our banking system is sound and resilient.

SVB failed because of a textbook case of mismanagement by the bank and that Federal Reserve supervisors failed to take forceful enough action.

What we found is that supervisors were essentially too timid and too slow to raise those standards in a timely enough way.

The banks we regulate, in contrast to stablecoins and crypto markets, are well-protected from bank runs through a robust array of supervisory requirements.

They failed in basic measures of interest rate risk and liquidity risk.

The Congress needs to increase the debt ceiling. There are no other options around that.

I want to know what the bank executives were doing in the months, weeks, and days leading up to this failure.