John Dewey

The dual capacity of every officer of the public leads to conflict in individuals between their genuinely political aims and acts and those which they possess in their non-political rôles.

When the public adopts special measures to see to it that the conflict is minimized and that the representative function overrides the private one, political institutions are termed representative.

But our definition is founded on the exercise of a function, not on any inherent essence or structural nature.

What is of importance is that the facts which significantly differentiate various forms from one another be recognized.

There has been a machinery of government, but it has been employed for purposes which in the strict sense are non-political, the deliberate advancement of dynastic interests.

Thus we come upon the primary problem of the public: to achieve such recognition of itself as will give it weight in the selection of official representatives and in the definition of their responsibilities and rights.

Taking history as a whole, the selection of rulers and equipment of them with powers has been a matter of political accident.

Persons have been selected as judges, executives and administrators for reasons independent of capacity to serve public interests.

History shows that, in the main, persons have ruled because of some prerogative and conspicuous place which was independent of their definitively public rôle.

If we introduce the idea of the public at all, we are bound to say that it was assumed without question that certain persons were fit to be rulers because of traits independent of political considerations.

Thus in many societies the male elders exercised such rule as obtained in virtue of the mere fact that they were old men.

If one wishes to realize the distance which may lie between “facts” and the meaning of facts, let one go to the field of social discussion.