David Obey: “based on information transmitted by these sources, the political appointees argued that the conclusions of the…”

“based on information transmitted by these sources, the political appointees argued that the conclusions of the intelligence community, the Joint Chiefs, and in particular General Shinseki, were in error and the invasion could be successfully carried out with fewer than 50,000 troops. While the chiefs in the end got most of the troops that they requested, it appears that the invasion was both lighter than they would have desired and lighter than what was required. The inability to fully protect supply lines did in fact result in the loss of life. The shortage of available personnel did leave certain critical sites such as nuclear facilities unprotected. We all know this is incredibly serious business. It is important not only to understand what we did or did not do with respect to Iraq, but it is far more important in terms of what we will do in the future. How will the information that the President and the Congress receive on our options in Korea be put together, for instance? Will the long-established collection mechanisms, evaluation and dissemination be used, or will we again fall back on the ad hoc efforts of this self-appointed group of experts? It is important to note that these same individuals have established a new office with an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.”