On the recordMay 17, 2016
This amendment aims to remedy a provision in the base text that could unnecessarily hamstring the vital work of preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear material. Section 3115 of the NDAA prohibits collaboration with Russia on atomic energy defense activities, but provides the Secretary of Energy with waiver authority. However, the Secretary of Energy can only exercise the waiver if there is a new emergency and if we completely eliminate the backlog of physical security maintenance work at DOE defense nuclear sites in the U.S. I stand with my colleagues in opposition to Russian aggression in Crimea, Ukraine, Syria, and threatening activity in the Baltics and elsewhere. However, I believe that the terms of this waiver are wrong and would be, frankly, impossible to execute. If we give the Secretary of Energy a waiver, it should be achievable. That is why my amendment improves the standard to a simple one: the Secretary must certify that this cooperation will significantly reduce the nuclear threat. It is no secret that nuclear material in Russia is vulnerable to theft and smuggling. According to Harvard University's Managing the Atom project, Russian nuclear material is at risk from both insiders and outsiders. Nuclear material stolen in Russia does not have to remain in Russia and, therefore, could be a threat to the homeland. Currently, we do not do any nuclear threat reduction work with Russia.…
