Orrin Hatch: “In choosing the term ``compelling,'' we relied on previous interpretation of that term in cases such as United States v.…”

“In choosing the term ``compelling,'' we relied on previous interpretation of that term in cases such as United States v. Walser, a 1993 case out of the Eleventh Circuit. That court analyzed a previous jury's decision--and whether it disadvantaged the defendant--under a standard of ``compelling prejudice.'' The court there made clear that it could not find ``compelling prejudice'' if ``under all the circumstances of [the] particular case it is within the capacity of jurors'' to reach the proper result--in the case of this bill, to find that the defendant committed the crime. If, in light of the DNA test, it would not be within the capacity of jurors to conclude that the defendant is guilty, a new trial must be granted under 3600(g). But if they could possibly find guilty, no new trial is allowed. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, under the ``compelling'' standard, if a decision is ``within the jury's capacity''--if it is reasonably possible--then ``though the task be difficult [for the hypothetical jury], there is no compelling prejudice''--or in our case, no compelling evidence requiring a new trial. As the Walser case also explains, you look to the trial transcript to decide what constitutes ``compelling'' evidence. Obviously, it is the defendant's burden to produce this evidence by other means if there is no trial transcript.”