On the recordDecember 20, 2010
I rise to speak about two or three topics in this debate on the START treaty, but first and foremost, one that speaks directly to the amendment that is pending. That is the question of verification--the ability for the United States to verify by way of inspection and other means what the Russian Federation has in terms of its nuclear weapons. First of all, I would say as a foundational principle in this debate, nothing in this treaty will in any way compromise the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. That is critical to make that point, and I think the American people understand that. But as the American people are listening to this debate about verification, I think it is important to outline the distinctions between the amendment and I think what is, in fact, the case in the treaty. The treaty itself allows each party up to 18 short-notice, on-site inspections, and that is each year, with up to 10 so-called type one inspections conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, submarines, and finally nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
