First, according to the Navy, and if we are going to save money, we have got to put a pencil to the balance sheet and we have to try to figure out whether extending the life of the C-4 is going to be cheaper or more expensive than buying the rest of the D-5. If money, and I would submit there is a lot more to this debate than just money, but if money is the object, we have got to put a pencil to it and see if it works. According to the Navy it does not work, and we end up spending $60 million more extending the life of the C-4 missile then completing the program on D-5. Now that is the fact. Second, let me just say to my friend, as my colleagues know, this is a long debate that we have been in; he and I have debated arms control for 16 years now, and I can recall the early days of the 1980's when Ronald Reagan was building a stronger strategic deterrent.
Editor's note · Context
Discussing the cost-effectiveness of missile programs during a debate on arms control.
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