On the recordMarch 19, 1999
Well, there are several questions there, but let me say, I think he should take this seriously, because we meant--we were serious in Bosnia. And it was the combined impact of NATO's action in Bosnia, plus the reversals they sustained on the ground in fighting, plus the economic embargo, that led them to conclude that peace was the better course. Now, he says here that this is not like what happened last fall, that this threatens Serbia's sovereignty to have a multinational force on the ground in Kosovo. But he has put that at risk by his decade--and I want to reemphasize that--his decade of denial of the autonomy to which the Kosovars are legally entitled as a part of Serbia. My intention would be to do whatever is possible, first of all, to weaken his ability to massacre them, to have another Bosnia; and secondly, to do all that I can to induce him to take--it is not my peace agreement. It was an agreement worked out and negotiated and argued over, with all the parties' concerns being taken into account. I will say again--for the longest time, we did not believe that either side would take this agreement. And the fact that the Kosovar Albanians did it, I think, reflects foresight and wisdom on their part. They did not get everything they wanted. And in a peace agreement, nobody ever gets everything they want. We've seen it in the Middle East, in Northern Ireland, everywhere else. So it is not my agreement. It is the best agreement that all the parties can get to give us a chance to go forward without bloodshed. I believe also, as I have said publicly to Mr. Milosevic and to the Serbs, it is their best chance to keep Kosovo as a part of Serbia and as a part of Yugoslavia. And so I would hope that the agreement could be accepted, and I'll do what I can to see that it is.
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