Bill Clinton: “Well, I would like to respond to those two things. Number one, on the compliance issue, keep in mind what the reports…”

“Well, I would like to respond to those two things. Number one, on the compliance issue, keep in mind what the reports say-- that you cannot, with 100 percent certainty, detect small nuclear tests everywhere in the world. That's all they say. Our national security people, including all of our people at the Pentagon, say that any test of the magnitude that would present any sort of threat to the United States could in fact be detected, number one. Number two, if we don't pass this treaty, such smaller tests will be even more likely to go undetected. Why? Because if the treaty goes into force, we'll have over 300 sophisticated sensors put out in places all across the world, and we'll have the right to onsite inspection, and we will also have the deterrent effect of people being found violating the treaty. Now, if you don't put the treaty into force, no sensors, no onsite inspections, no deterrent, and if the United States walks away from it, the rest of the world will think they've been given a green light. So I think that argument has literally no merit, because nothing changes except our ability to increase our determination of such tests with the passage of the treaty. Now, on the first argument--the idea that, some say, we can't with absolute 100 percent certainty maintain the integrity of the stockpiles--that is not what the people who lead the energy labs say. That's not what the Joint Chiefs say. Some people disagree--they do. They say they're not sure that forever-and-a-day we'll be able to do that. I have offered the Senate a reservation to the treaty which makes it clear that if ever there comes a time we think we can't preserve the integrity of our nuclear stockpile, we can take appropriate steps to do so, number one. Number two, we spend $4.5 billion a year, with by far the most sophisticated system in the world, to maintain that. Now, if all the-- this treaty doesn't go into effect unless all the nuclear powers and several dozen other countries agree to it; 44 in total must agree. If they all agree, I'm sure that all the people who are making this argument would acknowledge that our system of maintaining the integrity of our stockpile without tests is far in advance of what anybody else has. So our relative security will be increased, regardless. Final point I want to make: None of these people will stand up and say, let's start testing again. So what they're saying is, ``Okay, America won't test, but if everybody else tests, well, so be it.'' I think it would be a big mistake.”