On the recordMay 5, 1999
Well, it is, but I think that--look at the difference in the timetable of what we're doing now and what happened in Bosnia, where it took NATO navigating--with difficult circumstances with the U.N. for a long time--from at least 1991 until 1995 to act. And by the time we acted, it was a good thing we did--we saved a lot of lives--but a lot of the refugees didn't come home or haven't yet. Because we're moving now, I think the refugees will go home almost immediately when this is resolved. And that's a very good thing. That's a very important thing. And meanwhile, we're going to have to--all of us, the Europeans and the United States and Canada--we're going to have to spend the money and make the arrangements to care for the refugees. And we're going to have to be very sensitive not to put undue pressure on the daily life of Macedonia or of Albania, and we're going to have to work at it. I already this morning, since NATO is heavily involved in the refugee issue--and you and I are going to see evidence of that in our next stop--we talked quite a lot about what we have to do on that. This is going to be a huge challenge for NATO, for the U.N. High Commission on Refugees, for the NGO's around the world that are helping us. Espionage/European Stability Mr. Brokaw. Let me ask you a couple of concluding, tough questions. Your critics say the Clinton doctrine is: We bomb the small countries, Iraq and Kosovo, but when the big countries begin to give us trouble, we turn the other way. China and nuclear secrets is the most recent example of that. Isn't that a bigger risk, really, to the long-term history of the United States than Kosovo?
Source
govinfo.gov




