Bill Clinton: “Well, first of all, we are still involved in our consultations about it. Secondly, I don't think I can commit President…”

“Well, first of all, we are still involved in our consultations about it. Secondly, I don't think I can commit President Yeltsin to a course until he sees our proposal in writing. I can tell you, in general, what he said, however, which was that he agreed that the present understandings for air power were ineffective and that the Serbs plainly violated their agreement and overreached in Gorazde, something he's already said publicly. But he feels, as everyone does, that over the long run, NATO air power alone will not settle this conflict; this conflict will have to be settled by negotiations. Let me tell you the argument I made to him and the argument I want to make to you, because I know a lot of you have been as frustrated as have we by what happened in Gorazde. We have, through NATO, three separate authorizations for the use of air power, and air power has been used under two of those three. And arguably, the possibility of air power has been successful under two of those three, but they're not the same. Authorization number one is to enforce the no-fly zone. We have done that and planes have been shot down, as you know. And I think the no-fly zone clearly has been successful in preventing the war from spreading further into the air and the slaughter from coming from the airplanes. Option number two was the Sarajevo option. That is, a safe zone was created around Sarajevo, and all heavy weapons either had to be withdrawn from the safe zone or turned over to United Nations personnel. Then any heavy weapons shelling within the Sarajevo safe zone by anybody could trigger NATO air strikes. There were no NATO air strikes under that, but it clearly worked, and it was clearly more enforceable. Option number three is what you saw at Gorazde. Option number three gives the United Nations commander the authority to ask for United Nations civilian approval to ask for NATO air support to support the U.N. forces on the ground when they're under duress. Now, consider what the difference is between that and the Sarajevo option and all the conflicts that came along. First of all, you have to go through the approval process, which came quickly the first time when the NATO planes went in, the United States planes, and took the first action. But then you have to keep coming back for that approval. And you're always subject to an argument about who started what fight and what the facts were. And then what happened to us in Gorazde was, if an assault results in having the NATO forces close at hand with the aggressing forces or if NATO forces are captured, then any use of air power may lead to the killing of the very people we're there trying to protect. Whereas under the Sarajevo model, you can just say, ``Okay, here's the safe zone. All the heavy weaponry has to be withdrawn or put under U.N. control, and if there's any violation by anybody, there can be air action.'' It is a much clearer thing. That is a point I made very strongly to President Yeltsin. I think he was quite sympathetic with it. His only point was the same point that everyone makes, which is that in the end, the use of air power by NATO cannot bring this war to an end. Only a negotiated settlement can do that. I think that, generally, you will see the United States and Russia working together, and I've been impressed by how aggressive the Russians have been with regard to the Serbs in this. Yes, go ahead. I'll take it.”