On the recordJuly 9, 1997
Well, first of all, the weapons they would have to buy would be conditioned more than anything else on what kinds of missions they believe they will be called upon to undertake. If they, for example, are sending their troops to Bosnia, if there is some future Bosnia or some other peacekeeping role, as NATO troops, we would want them to be as well-armed as possible to protect themselves. That doesn't mean they have to buy the most expensive weapons to do everything in the world, but it does mean that if they're going to undertake the projected missions of NATO, they would need to be appropriately trained and armed. Secondly, one of the things that I believe that I noted at this meeting was that there had not been a great deal of work done in many countries about what the costs were. I think some people in the United States have grossly overestimated the costs of NATO expansion. I do believe that the nations involved should pay most of the costs themselves. But it's not just a question of that. There will be joint training to be done, just like there is in the Partnership For Peace, but it will be conducted at a higher level. There will be joint planning to be done. So a lot of the costs that would be borne would be extra activities for the armed forces that are already there from these countries. And then there will be some infrastructure that will have to be built in the countries of members so that we can have what is called interoperability. And I would expect that these costs will be modest for all countries, but I would think that the Europeans and the United States and Canada will have modest costs that we will bear. And I think most of the costs will be borne by the member states. It was up to them to make that judgment. I think, if you take--let's just take the Czech Republic. President Havel, I think, is widely recognized as an apostle of peace and as someone who's interested in all the kinds of domestic concerns to improve the quality of life in the Czech Republic that you would expect. To have a modest but strong defense is a precondition, I believe, over the long run, for Europe avoiding the kind of instabilities that could undermine the quality of life. So I think as long as--we're not talking about getting into an arms race or bankrupting their budgets, and these were judgments that they were all in a position to make. I will say this. One of the things that I think animated our decisions on how many countries should come in, and when, is that we want countries to be able to do this and afford to do it without undermining quality of life at home, because the public in those countries has to continue to support both democracy and free market reforms and engagement, constructive engagement with other nations. 1996 Campaign Financing
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