The administration's goal remains a managed political transition led by the Syrian people.

. . . it hasn't achieved the objective, obviously.

Once you are in, you cannot unwind it.

I think the fragmentation of leadership needs to be addressed to make this scenario work.

There is little disagreement that the nuclear weapons complex must be modernized.

we must not allow regional actors, such as North Korea, to hold U.S. policy hostage by making our citizens vulnerable to a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile attack.

Without them, we could not maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent.

I would echo what the Chairman said. In addition, I would just tell you, this committee, that I am committed to working with you to try to find some way we can do more responsibly that is effective.

The potential proliferation of chemical weapons in Syria is one of our top security concerns today.

DOD takes its treaty obligations seriously and reviews its plans carefully to ensure compliance.

Should the Assad regime use chemical weapons, I would be concerned about the welfare and safety of the Syrian people.

The United States is heavily engaged in supporting the SOC and SMC as a counterweight to extremist elements in Syria.

I have joined with him in pressing to look for additional ways to put military pressure on Assad, sending a message of inevitability, a message of determination, and I think for many reasons, the sooner the better.

If we did not get into this the right way, if we get into it, there could be more bloodshed.

The transfer of chemical weapons to terrorists will not be allowed.

The United States remains in close contact with Israel on the deteriorating situation in Syria.

You better always ask the end game questions. Where is this going? Where is it likely to end?

It is still not clear enough to make any conclusive adjustments to a policy recommendation.