Is $100 billion a sufficient investment in our nuclear delivery systems over the next decade?

What other potential strategic or political consequences could result from various levels of Russian cheating?

Mr. D'Agostino, will disconnects between the NWSP and the SSMP be resolved through an increased budget request starting in fiscal year 2012?

What assurances can you provide that the administration is committed to modernizing the above programs?

New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments over the life of the treaty.

Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, you suggest it is stabilizing for the United States to deploy only single reentry vehicle ICBMs.

Dr. Miller, don't we need better verification at lower levels than we needed at higher force levels?

Will the United States maintain enough nondeployed warheads during the life of the treaty to fully upload each U.S. delivery system?

Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what's the likelihood that we would detect this in a timely manner?

The New START treaty, as was the case in the START treaty, makes no distinction between nuclear or conventionally armed missiles.

What are your thoughts on how the United States will engage Russia on its overwhelming number of tactical nuclear weapons?

Mr. D'Agostino, you also state that one of your priorities is to 'strengthen the science, technology, and engineering base,' yet most of these funds are clearly for facility improvements.

The United States could substantially upload the ballistic missile submarine leg of the triad with hundreds of additional warheads.

The New START treaty sets the stage for further negotiations with Russia on measures to reduce both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons.

Mr. D'Agostino, since 70 percent of these funds will not show up until 2016, what near-term risk do you foresee in this budget plan?

The United States could also choose to return a portion of its heavy bomber force to an alert posture.

I do not think Russian cheating on New START would be irrelevant.

Any secret Russian deployments of any ballistic missiles or warheads in violation of New START treaty provisions would concern me due to the political significance of deliberate Russian cheating.