All Quotes

Isn't that what OCO [overseas contingency operations] was all about?

So basically what you're saying is if you don't have additional funding over and above what you had for last year, you'd run out of money and that's why you'd have to ground those squadrons.

I agree with you that it's no way to govern, and we shouldn't be even thinking about a further continuing resolution for the rest of the year.

Resources are never unlimited, and the Air Force must make investments based on near-term risks as well as future threats.

Too many defensive acquisition programs over-promise and under-deliver on cost and schedule.

I want to emphasize on a timely basis--while protecting our taxpayers' dollars.

I want to emphasize dominate--near-peer adversaries across the full spectrum of military operations.

Another opportunity--and I hate to raise the word 'joint' because it does not have a very good history in military procurement.

But I would also add to that list of items the process itself as it relates to their ability to interact with the Pentagon.

I just commend that to you. I would suggest a summit meeting in San Jose about what are the issues and how do we improve this program.

What about that as an option?

Practicality and buildability is part of the requirements process.

I am a great believer that structure is policy. If you have a messy structure, you end up with a messy policy.

The first requirement would be that the requirements be expressed in no more than 10 pages.

I think that is very important that we do not forget those lessons, that they are embedded somehow in the formal process and in the structure.

Now, has the Army made institutional structural changes to deal with these issues?

Well, that is exactly the experience of the Air Force and to some extent the Navy of doing R&D while you are building.

Where did it break down?