On the recordDecember 1, 2011
The November 8 IAEA report underscores the need for this amendment. It undeniably confirms that there is a military component to Iran's nuclear program; that Iran has not suspended its Iranian enrichment and conversion activities at declared facilities and is seeking to develop as many as 10 new enrichment facilities; that there are undisclosed nuclear facilities in Iran; that Iran is seeking back channels to acquire dual-use technology and materials; that Iran is experimenting and testing detonators and initiation systems critical to creating a nuclear weapon; and that Iran may be working on an indigenous design for a nuclear weapon, including a nuclear payload small enough to fit on Iran's long-range Shahab missile, a missile capable of reaching Israel. These public revelations have led to an increase in multilateral sanctions on the Iranian regime, which I applaud, but given what appears to be a shortening timeline until Iran has a potential nuclear weapon, it would seem we are not doing enough fast enough. Iran has adapted to CISADA and has negotiated workarounds to constraints on its financial transactions and its ability to acquire requisite materials to advance its clandestine program. This amendment will prevent those workarounds.…





