On the recordNovember 30, 2010
I rise today to speak once again about the New START treaty. Today I will talk about the New START treaty and the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. That means maintaining and sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery platforms; modernizing the buildings and equipment in the nuclear weapons complex; and supporting the experts and scientists who are involved in it. I would like to preface my remarks by underlining the urgency for the Senate to ratify the treaty. How can it be that we do not have a treaty with Russia in place, along with its verification regime 360 days after the expiration of the original START treaty? That is more than 6 months after the administration submitted the treaty to the Senate. The verification regime will provide crucial insight into Russian forces, insight that is degrading over time without the treaty in place. We need to ratify this treaty now. For decades, our relations with the Soviet Union, and now with Russia, have been stabilized and made more predictable and cooperative through arms control agreements. How can it be that now, when Russia is no longer our enemy and yet not our ally, my friends across the aisle are refusing to move forward on ratifying a modest treaty that is critical for our national security? If consideration of the treaty is delayed or blocked, it will make cooperation with Russia on national security interests much more difficult, if not impossible.
