The bubble burst in 2007. We are looking at the causes of that bubble bursting.

As we put it in the vernacular, the big short allowed you to have a year in the black, is that----

So why do you end up with $2.5 billion of taxpayers' money in your pocket when we don't owe you the money?

But it was the big short which kept you in the black that year, wasn't it?

I do have a problem with taking a short position on a security that you are selling to your customer.

You shouldn't be selling junk. You shouldn't be selling crap. You shouldn't be betting against your own customer at the same time you are selling to them.

You guys were profitable, and you were profitable because you had invested heavily in shorts.

You were consistently short. As a matter of fact, you were very short.

You increased protection on disaster scenarios.

It could have been more accurate.

OK. Well, this is a letter that Goldman Sachs sent to the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7.

You are out there selling these securities. This isn't someone walking in the door.

What do you think about selling securities which your own people think are crap? Does that bother you?

This is much more than a market maker. You are keeping a proprietary interest in a position that is exactly the opposite of what you are selling.

Your salesperson believed it was junk.

That was taxpayers' money, Mr. Blankfein.

You knew Paulson was on the short side of the trade. Is that correct?

Well, if it weren't for the big short, you would have been deeply in the red that year, wouldn't you?

Did you bet big time in 2007 against the housing mortgage business, and you did.

Do you see where the second paragraph says, 'At the end of the meeting, the Paulson team'--this is you speaking--'told us that they were happy to have met'...

Most honest observers would acknowledge that the roads of responsibilities lead to places like Washington and Congress as well as Wall Street.

Billions seem large to a lot of folks who have lost their homes.

The percentage of contribution to the firm-wide VaR was shown in that exhibit at 53.8 percent for mortgage structured products, is that correct?

It is important to note however that we are active traders of mortgage securities and loans.

And where you take a short position, do you think that should be disclosed? Where you are betting against that same security you are selling--yes or no, do you think that ought to be disclosed or not?