Well, the math may work out for you, but the question is whether or not that is what you said, and we will find out more about that.

In fact, it was increasing in size.

All right. So that this is wrong, this email is wrong. Is that correct?

We had a $157 billion high-risk derivatives portfolio here that OCC hardly knew existed, and that strikes me as being a hidden financial risk.

Should the OCC have been informed about that?

We have gone into the concerns which we have had about the whale trades all day long.

Now, rather than identifying risks to be offset, are you also going to identify the assets to be offset?

And when he testified that the SCP was to protect against Scenarios 2 and 4, you go all the way over to number 10 to try to find some scenario in which it might be helpful.

It is his decision, not Mr. Braunstein's decision, to do that.

Well, in general, let me ask you, Mr. Curry, what is your reaction to that activity, reducing the RWA not by selling risky assets but by designing models in order to produce lower numbers?

Well, we have already covered some of the matters involving hidden financial risks, mismarking, breaches of risk limits, and public disclosure problems.

We identified serious risk management weaknesses throughout the entire Firm, and they became particularly evident in the CIO office.

You think the average person listening to this would not think you were referring to the trades that were at issue that blew up?

Shouldn't investors have known during that call that the current status of the SCP was not great, it was losing a lot of money, huge positions that it had were hard to exit, it had been violating all five risk limits?

It turned out that was not true.

We thank our witnesses here, and we have seen today a very disturbing picture which raises questions not just about JPMorgan but about derivatives in general.

These regulatory capital requirements are one of the most important tools that we have to ensure the safety and soundness of our financial system.

Were you aware of the fact that it had not been reviewed every year?

All right. So when Ms. Drew said you were, or she thought you were, she was wrong. You were not.

Is it not true that when a derivatives portfolio gets to be that big that there is a special danger?

Was it a coincidence that the way in which those marks were made changed to reduce the losses on the books at the time those losses were piling up?

But its general direction, its general theme is to lead to tougher risk controls, is it not?

OK. So that in 2012, the Synthetic Credit Portfolio was being actively traded, right?

It seems to our review that, absolutely, the----

Did the London traders have to get approval of the CIO risk managers like you to put on positions?