Now, specialty lending is what Washington Mutual called its subprime operations after it abolished Long Beach as a separate entity and took over the subprime lending function itsel...
So 132 sampled were identified with red flags, reading from this report, and of that, 115 had confirmed fraud.
And those were high risk?
There should be a reasonableness test when these subprime mortgages are originated.
And the report said that most of the fraud was due to willful behavior of WaMu employees.
So they indicated they would make changes.
Management Control Weaknesses were identified by you at that first bullet point, which is about two-thirds of the way down.
It also went to the chairman and chief executive officer, Mr. Killinger. Do you see that on the right?
Now, according to this memo, the push to increase loan volume made things worse.
Is it fair to say that WaMu was not particularly worried about the risk associated with Long Beach subprime mortgages because it sold those ...
You were aware of it at the time?