I am concerned that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment of other AOR's like the Pacific.

It is paramount to our national security to continue to have unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR.

I remain concerned that even while our Services move to expanded ISR platforms, we still--we still--do not have sufficient coverage in the Pacific.

I stressed that assuming risk is expected in any budget, especially in our operation and maintenance budgets.

I hope that our witnesses today can contextualize their remarks with these strategic documents as guides.

So, in other words, no definite decisions have been made, and as you said it is a work in progress.

With your support for this plan, the Army will meet near-term BOG: Dwell goals of 1:2 AC and 1:4 RC starting in FY 12.

Congress should exercise stringent oversight of this practice to ensure that no good deeds are being inadvertently punished.

It is indeed difficult to measure military readiness without knowing what the measure of effectiveness may be to declare 'strategic readiness.'

The military services have adopted a rotational readiness construct which enables deployed and deploying forces to obtain the highest level of readiness.

The QDR report identified force structure requirements and capabilities to deal with challenges and threat to U.S. interests.