We conclude that the strategic deterrent is not just a nuclear deterrent, it is a combination of conventional and nuclear.

The threat briefings that we received leave no question that both China and Russia, but particularly China see space as a war fighting domain.

It's enough that it's opportunistic. In other words, we're in a conflict with one, and the other sees that this is an opportunity.

that's why we say that has to be decided now.

we have to make decisions now to make sure that we have the capacity to build whatever we're going to need to build.

One of our recommendations concerns ways that we could potentially mitigate the risk of a deterrence gap.

The first thing we've got to do is have a conventional capability which is so dominant that no party would ever consider a nuclear attack against the United States.

the answer is yes, it's inadequate today.

Mr. Chairman, Representative Jacobs, the fact is that our current system has deteriorated and aged to the point that we wouldn't be confident in the deterrent value of it on out into the future.

the answer to your question is yes.

SLCM-N would achieve the objective that we set out.