It would not come on a routine basis.
We had a $157 billion high-risk derivatives portfolio here that OCC hardly knew existed, and that strikes me as being a ...
Everyone knows what is going on and there is little need for more limits, controls, or reports.
So that was just a failure at the OCC.
But it is supposed to be at least once a year, isn't it?
Now, in May 2012, after the media disclosure of the whale trades, the bank determined the new VaR model was not portrayi...
These regulatory capital requirements are one of the most important tools that we have to ensure the safety and soundnes...
one of our recommendations in our report is that the OCC get banks to use independent pricing services
Yes, absolutely. And it is important for us as the regulator to know what the actual market is and be informed on a time...
We recommend that the OCC tell banks to use independent pricing services to remove the temptation from their own employe...
You had no reason to believe it until April 2012?
The responsibility would lie first and foremost with management, to have the proper risk systems and controls, proper re...
All right. So when Ms. Drew said you were, or she thought you were, she was wrong. You were not.
Which is a little different from what you said, which is that they 'get the information on those positions on a regular ...
And when he testified that the SCP was to protect against Scenarios 2 and 4, you go all the way over to number 10 to try...
He was just pursuing a mathematical interest. He was not operating in furtherance of the bank's goals?
What we have seen during this investigation is the evidence that JPMorgan piled on risk, broke risk limits, hid losses, ...
Is it not obvious what was happening here, that these prices were being changed in order to reduce the loss on the books...
