It also went to the chairman and chief executive officer, Mr. Killinger. Do you see that on the right?
Management Control Weaknesses were identified by you at that first bullet point, which is about two-thirds of the way do...
So they indicated they would make changes.
And the report said that most of the fraud was due to willful behavior of WaMu employees.
There should be a reasonableness test when these subprime mortgages are originated.
And those were high risk?
So 132 sampled were identified with red flags, reading from this report, and of that, 115 had confirmed fraud.
Now, specialty lending is what Washington Mutual called its subprime operations after it abolished Long Beach as a separ...
Did the audit find that Long Beach then was consistently approving poor loans?
Mr. Schneider was certainly concerned with the issues.
Now, this high-risk strategy of WaMu, the shift from low risk to high risk, was first implemented in 2004.
Home Loans Risk Mitigation generated alerts that identified patterns of fraudulent loan practices and provided remediati...
the events of 2007 were covered in the 2008 report that we are looking at.
I was deeply concerned to the point where there was no question that this had to be escalated up to the Audit Committee.
Had there been a surge of loans that had to be repurchased as well?
Based on the consistent and pervasive pattern of activity among these employees, we are recommending firm action be take...
At least that was the goal.
That is called a high risk to the business unit. Is that correct?
