But by 2005, the problems started erupting again with a surge of early payment defaults.
Why weren't securitizations halted in 2005, 2006, and 2007 when similar underwriting problems were uncovered?
Now, there was a big appetite for residential mortgages on Wall Street until September 2007, is that true?
And when WaMu qualified a borrower for an Option ARM loan, did the bank use the payment that the borrower would have to ...
How does a bank that turns out loans of which 58 or 62 or 83 percent contain misrepresentations or fraudulent borrower i...
We are contemplating selling a larger portion of our Option ARMs than we have in the recent past.
No, when there was fraud, what you do is reward the folks that are being investigated with trips.
Wasn't there a recommendation in 2005 to take action against those officers?
Why were so many Long Beach mortgages defaulted? Why were Long Beach securities consistently among the worst performing ...
And the audit that you saw when you first got there, that 2006 audit, which is Exhibit 10, was the reason, as I understa...
And is it true that, as shown in Exhibit 37, at times, 95 percent of WaMu's Option ARM borrowers were making minimum pay...
Purchasers of these securities are relying on you as an underwriter to provide truthful information.
So Long Beach was continuing to issue poor quality loans, is that fair to say?
Until then, there was a huge appetite, is that fair to say, for residential mortgages on Wall Street?
Now, the fraud problem is not limited to Montebello and Downey.
You were aware of it at the time?
Is it fair to say that WaMu was not particularly worried about the risk associated with Long Beach subprime mortgages be...
Now, according to this memo, the push to increase loan volume made things worse.
