The reason that Option ARM loans were selected is because they were most likely to go delinquent.
Did they know, were they informed that loans with those or some of those characteristics had a greater propensity toward...
You say you adopted this shift to high-risk strategy in 2004 and 2005. Is that correct?
You changed your strategy.
We have to do some financial reform in the Senate.
It also went to the chairman and chief executive officer, Mr. Killinger. Do you see that on the right?
And would you say that the criteria were looser as a result of that demand?
Long Beach represents a real problem for WaMu.
And the push to increase loan volume made things worse?
Extreme greed was the driving force, and it will happen again unless we change the rules.
So 132 sampled were identified with red flags, reading from this report, and of that, 115 had confirmed fraud.
Management Control Weaknesses were identified by you at that first bullet point, which is about two-thirds of the way do...
And the report said that most of the fraud was due to willful behavior of WaMu employees.
Now, specialty lending is what Washington Mutual called its subprime operations after it abolished Long Beach as a separ...
Did the audit find that Long Beach then was consistently approving poor loans?
And did it find that Long Beach had weak controls over the loan approval process?
LBMC [Long Beach] experienced a dramatic increase in EPDs [early payment defaults] during the third quarter of 2005.
There should be a reasonableness test when these subprime mortgages are originated.
